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State Sovereignty and Federal Court
Power: The Eleventh Amendment after
Pennhurst v. Halderman
By ERWIN CHEMERINSKY*
The persistent problem of federalism is how to preserve state sover-
eignty while assuring the supremacy of federal law. Nowhere is this ten-
sion more apparent than in the Supreme Court's interpretations of the
Eleventh Amendment. The Court has interpreted the Eleventh Amend-
ment to preclude suits against state governments in federal court,
whether brought by their own citizens or citizens of other states, regard-
less of whether the suit is in law or equity.' Such an expansive reading of
the Eleventh Amendment effectively immunizes the actions of state gov-
ernment from federal court review, even when a state violates the most
fundamental constitutional rights. Unwilling, however, to trust state
courts completely to uphold and enforce the Constitution and federal
laws, the Supreme Court has devised a number of ways to circumvent the
broad prohibition of the Eleventh Amendment and assure federal court
review of certain allegedly illegal state actions.2 The case law concerning
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Southern California Law Center. I want to
thank Susan Bandes, Scott Bice, Robert Bone, William Marshall, Judith Resnik, and Marcy
Strauss for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. I also wish to thank
Pamela Westhoff for her excellent research assistance.
1. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890) (suits against a state are barred regardless of
the citizenship of the plaintiff). In Hans, a Louisiana resident sued Louisiana to compel state
officials to pay money owed under state issued bonds and coupons. The Court held that a suit
against an unconsenting state, even when brought by a citizen of that state, was "unknown to
the law. . . [and] not contemplated by the Constitution when establishing the judicial power
of the United States." Id. at 15. See infra discussion accompanying notes 27-29. Since Hans,
federal court suits by citizens against their own states have been disallowed. See, e.g., Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Tuveson v. Florida Governor's Council on Indian Affairs, Inc.,
734 F.2d 730 (11 th Cir. 1984); Allegheny County Sanitary Auth. v. United States Envtl. Pro-
tection Agency, 732 F.2d 1167 (3d Cir. 1984); Wallace v. Oklahoma, 721 F.2d 301 (10th Cir.
1983). See also Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 27 (1933) (bar to suit exists regardless of the
nature of the relief sought).
2. See, e.g., Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (holding that suits against state officers
are permissible if state officers are alleged to violate federal law). See infra discussion accom-
panying notes 59-80. For a discussion of the background surrounding the decision in Ex parte
Young, see Mathis, The Eleventh Amendment: Adoption and Interpretation, 2 GA. L. REv.
207, 239-45 (1968). In addition, a state can be sued notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment
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the Eleventh Amendment often has been conflicting and inconsistent as
the Court has struggled to articulate a standard that protects state auton-
omy yet still assures state compliance with federal law.3
At first glance, the Supreme Court's recent decision concerning the
Eleventh Amendment, Pennhurst v. Halderman,4 seems to have little to
do with resolving the inherent tension between state sovereignty and fed-
eral supremacy. In Pennhurst, the Supreme Court held that federal
courts are barred by the Eleventh Amendment from enjoining state of-
ficers from violating state law. The Court further ruled that although
federal courts may hear federal claims against state officers, they may not
hear pendent state-law claims. Justice Powell, writing for the majority,
stated: "[A] claim that state officials violated state law in carrying out
their official responsibilities is a claim against the State that is protected
by the Eleventh Amendment. We [also]. . .hold that this principle ap-
plies as well to state law claims brought into federal court under pendent
jurisdiction." 5
Because this decision only affects the ability of federal courts to give
relief against state officers based on state-law claims, the case might ap-
pear to be a relatively narrow and unimportant modification of Eleventh
Amendment principles. Close examination of the Court's reasoning and
if it waives its immunity to suits in federal court. See, e.g., Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S.
184 (1964). However, the United States Supreme Court has limited the doctrine of waiver in a
number of ways. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105 S. Ct. 3142 (1985);
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v.
Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973). For a discussion of a state's
waiver of its Eleventh Amendment immunity, see infra text accompanying notes 33-35.
3. Compare In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 507 (1887) (Eleventh Amendment is a jurisdic-
tional bar) with Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 205 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1049 (1972) (Eleventh Amendment is a reflection of common law sovereign immunity). Com-
pare Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964) (a state can constructively waive its Elev-
enth Amendment immunity) with Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 3147
(1985) (a state must declare its intention to subject itself to suit specifically in federal court for
doctrine of waiver to apply). See also Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Employees of
Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
4. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). For an excellent
discussion of the importance of Pennhurst, focusing on Pennhurst's departure from precedent
and critiquing it on grounds different than those presented in this article, see Shapiro, Wrong
Turns: The Eleventh Amendment and the Pennhurst Case, 98 HARV. L. REv. 61 (1984). See
also Brown, Beyond Pennhurst: Protective Jurisdiction, the Eleventh Amendment, and the
Power of Congress to Enlarge Federal Jurisdiction in Response to the Burger Court, 71 VA. L.
RFV. 343 (1985) (focusing on congressional ability to protect federal interests by expanding
federal court jurisdiction beyond that authorized in the Constitution); Rudenstine, Pennhurst
and the Scope of Federal Judicial Power to Reform Social Institutions, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 71
(1984) (focusing on the impact of Pennhurst in terms of federal court injunctions against state
officers).
5. 465 U.S. at 121.
PENNHURST V. HALDERMAN
especially its rhetoric, however, reveals the potentially broad implica-
tions of Pennhurst for the interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment,
federalism, and federal court powers. Pennhurst threatens to undermine
the ability of the federal courts to remedy state and local goverment vio-
lations of the United States Constitution as well as the continued viability
of pendent jurisdiction.
Part I of this Article briefly summarizes the history of the Pennhurst
litigation. Part II examines the three very different theories that have
been developed to explain the Eleventh Amendment. The adoption by
the Pennhurst Court of one of those theories-that the Eleventh Amend-
ment is a constitutional limit on the subject matter jurisdiction of the
federal courts-has potentially sweeping implications, not only for the
availability of a federal forum, but for our very system of federalism as
well. Finally, Part III considers ways in which the effects of Pennhurst
can be limited to insure that federal courts remain available to halt un-
constitutional state and local actions.
I. Pennhurst v. Halderman: History of the Litigation
The facts of the Pennhurst case are complex.6 In 1974, Terri Lee
Halderman was a resident of the Pennhurst State School and Hospital,
an institution operated by the State of Pennsylvania for the care of the
mentally retarded. Ms. Halderman initiated a class action suit in federal
court on behalf of all persons who are or might become residents of Pen-
nhurst, seeking to improve dramatically the conditions that were alleged
to be inhumane and grossly inadequate. Defendants to the suit included
the hospital and various hospital officials, the Pennsylvania Department
of Public Welfare and several of its officials, and various county commis-
sioners and county mental retardation officials. The suit claimed the
conditions at Pennhurst violated the class members' rights under the
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution,
as well as federal statutes7 and state laws.8 Both injunctive relief and
damages were sought.
After a lengthy trial, the district court, in 1977, rendered its deci-
6. The Supreme Court provides a detailed description of the factual history of the Penn-
hurst litigation. Id. at 92-97. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit also
provides a detailed description of the history of the litigation. Halderman v. Pennhurst State
School & Hosp., 673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982) (en bane).
7. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, § 504, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1983). Assistance and Bill of
Rights Act, 89 Stat. 496, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6083 (Supp. 1985).
8. Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, 50 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN., §§ 4101-4704 (Purdon 1985).
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sion in favor of the plaintiffs.9 The trial court based its decision on un-
disputed findings that "[c]onditions at Pennhurst are not only dangerous,
with the residents often physically abused or drugged by staff members,
but also inadequate for the 'habilitation' of the retarded."10 Finding fur-
ther that "the physical, intellectual, and emotional skills of some resi-
dents have deteriorated at Pennhurst,"'  the court concluded that
conditions at Pennhurst violated the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the United States Constitution in addition to fed-
eral statutes, and state law.12 According to the district court, these
authorities require that "if a state undertakes the habilitation of a re-
tarded person, it must do so ipi the least restrictive setting consistent with
that individual's habilitative needs." 3 The court ordered, in part, that
"immediate steps be taken to remove the retarded residents from
Pennhurst."' 4
The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed
the district court's finding of liability. II The court of appeals agreed that
residents of the hospital have a right to habilitation in the least restrictive
environment. 16 The court based its decision, however, entirely on its
conclusion that the state was violating the "bill of rights" included in the
Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act. 1" The ap-
peals court found it unnecessary to determine whether there were also
violations of the United States Constitution or other federal or state laws.
The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Third
Circuit.' 8 The Court held that states were not required to comply with
the "bill of rights" in the Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill
of Rights Act. 19 Although the bill of rights contained in the Act ap-
peared to be binding upon all states receiving federal grants under the
Act, the Court held that Congress may require state compliance with
conditions in federal grants only if the conditions are clear and unequivo-
9. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
10. Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 7 (1981).
11. Id.
12. Id. at 7.
13. 446 F. Supp. at 1319.
14. Id. at 1325.
15. 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc). The Third Circuit reversed and remanded,
however, on the issue of appropriate relief.
16. Id. at 107.
17. Developmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6083
(1985) (§ 6010 omitted in 1984. Currently appears as § 6009). The Bill of Rights provision is
section 6010.
18. 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
19. Id. at 15-18.
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cal.20 Concluding that the Act did not explicitly create any such substan-
tive rights,21 the Court remanded the case to the court of appeals to
determine if the district court's result could be supported on the basis of
state law, the United States Constitution, or Section 504 of the Rehabili-
tation Act.22
On remand, the court of appeals affirmed its earlier decision, con-
cluding that the plaintiffs were entitled to relief because of violations of
Pennsylvania law.21 Specifically, the Third Circuit held that recent deci-
sions by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania established that under state
law the state was obligated to adopt the least restrictive environment ap-
proach for the care of the mentally retarded. The court concluded that
the violations of state law were sufficient to justify the relief imposed, and
therefore did not consider whether the result also could be justified based
on the United States Constitution or other federal statutes.
The case again went to the United States Supreme Court and again
the Court reversed the Third Circuit's decision. The Court held that the
Eleventh Amendment bars injunctive relief against state officers on the
basis of state law,2 4 and remanded the case once more to the Third Cir-
cuit to determine if the district court's remedy could be based on viola-
tions of the Constitution or federal laws.
II. Why Pennhurst Matters: The Threat to Federal Court
Jurisdiction
A. Theories of Eleventh Amendment Interpretation
Although the Eleventh Amendment is almost two hundred years
old, there still is no agreement as to what it means or what it prohibits.
In fact, three very different theories have developed to interpret it. The
Court in Pennhurst makes clear that it interprets the Eleventh Amend-
ment as a constitutional bar to suits against a state by its own citizens. 25
The language of the Eleventh Amendment prohibits only suits
against a state by citizens of other states. It states: "The Judicial power
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
State." Nonetheless, in 1890, the Supreme Court held in Hans v. Louisi-
20. Id. at 17.
21. Id. at 18.
22. Id. at 30-31.
23. 673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc).
24. 465 U.S. at 120-21.
25. Id. at 99-103.
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ana2 6 that it would be "anomalous" to allow states to be sued by their
own citizens.27 Since Hans, states have been immune to suits both by
their own citizens and citizens of other states,28 although the Court in
Hans did not explicitly create a constitutional barrier to suit. Whether
the Eleventh Amendment erects that barrier depends upon the theory of
interpretation adopted. There are three different ways of viewing the
Eleventh Amendment: as a restriction on federal court subject matter
jurisdiction; as a reinstatement of common law immunity; and as a limit
only on diversity suits against state governments. '
In Pennhurst, the Court chooses an interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment that gives constitutional status to a state's immunity from
federal suits brought by its own citizens. Under this theory, the Eleventh
Amendment is viewed as creating a constitutional restriction on subject
matter jurisdiction, precluding federal courts from hearing any suits
against state governments.29 By this view, Hans interprets the Eleventh
Amendment as a constitutional bar to suits against a state by its own
citizens as well as by citizens of other states.
Two major problems have always plagued advocates of this theory.
First, the language of the Eleventh Amendment simply states that it only
applies to suits against a state by citizens of other states. Principles of
construction require that literal language be followed where clear.3" Fur-
thermore, traditional theories of interpretation look to the legislative his-
tory of a provision.3" The Eleventh Amendment was added to the
26. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
27. Id. at 18.
28. See, e.g., Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub.
Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 280 (1973) ("[Aln unconsenting State is immune from suits
brought in federal courts by her own citizens as well as by citizens of another State."); Exparte
State of New York No. 1, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) (federal courts may not hear suits "brought
by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of a foreign State, because of the Elev-
enth Amendment; and not even one brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental
rule of which the Amendment is but an exemplification").
29. See, e.g., Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 98. ("[Ihe principle of sovereign immunity is a
constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. III .. "); Missouri
v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 25 (1933) ("The Eleventh Amendment is an explicit limitation of the
judicial power of the United States.").
30. See, e.g., Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29 UCLA L. REv. 797, 828
(1982) (language of Constitution provides starting place in analysis and a boundary of permis-
sible constitutional interpretation). Constitutional commentators have assumed that the text
of the Constitution is to be followed where it is clear. See, e.g., M. PERRY, THE CONSTrru-
TION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS ix (1982).
31. There is a major debate over how much weight, if any, should be given to the "fram-
ers' intent" in constitutional interpretation. The literature on the subject is voluminous. For
citations to some of this literature and a review of the debate, see Chemerinsky, The Price of
Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay on Constitutional Scholarship and Judicial Review, 62
TEX. L. REv. 1207 (1984).
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Constitution to reverse the Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v.
Georgia,3 which had upheld the right of a South Carolina resident to sue
the State of Georgia. The focus was on protecting a state from suits by
citizens of other states. Thus, the language and history of the Eleventh
Amendment do not justify reading it as creating a constitutional bar to
suits against states by their own citizens. I am not arguing that this view
of the Eleventh Amendment should be rejected because of the Framers'
intent. Rather, if the framers' intent and legislative history are given
great weight, they do not support the Court's current view of the Elev-
enth Amendment and that, as such, this theory must be justified by
something other than arguments from the text on the drafters' intent.
A second problem with viewing the Eleventh Amendment as a con-
stitutional restriction on subject matter jurisdiction is that the Supreme
Court repeatedly and consistently has held that a state may waive its
Eleventh Amendment immunity.33 In Hans, for example, the Court ob-
served that a state is immune "unless the state consents to be sued
.... ,34 However, waiver should not be possible if the Eleventh
Amendment creates a restriction on subject matter jurisdiction. A fun-
damental principle of federal court jurisdiction is that subject matter ju-
risdiction may not be gained in federal court through consent or
waiver.35 As courts of limited jurisdiction, federal courts are empowered
to hear only those matters explicitly provided for both in the Constitu-
tion and federal law.36 Agreement of the parties is never sufficient to
create federal court jurisdiction when it otherwise would not be al-
32. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793). For especially helpful discussions of the background of
this case, see C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 46-57
(1972); Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construc-
tion of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35
STAN. L. REv. 1033 (1983); Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity:
A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1889 (1983); Orth, The Interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment, 1798-1908: A Case Study of Judicial Power, 1983 U. ILL. L.F. 423.
33. "A sovereign's immunity may be waived, and the Court consistently has held that a
State may consent to suit against it in federal court." 465 U.S. at 99. See, e.g., Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105 S. Ct. 3142 (1985); Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improve-
ment Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 531 (1936) ("Like any sovereignty, a state may voluntarily consent
to be sued."); Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436 (1883).
34. 134 U.S. at 20 (emphasis added).
35. See, eg., Sonsa v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 398 (1975); Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237,
244 (1934); Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. v. Swan, 11 U.S. 379, 382 (1884). The rule that federal
subject matter jurisdiction may not be waived arises from the fact that federal courts are courts
of limited jurisdiction, a principle that can be traced back, in part, to Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803). See generally 13 WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, JURISDICTION,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3552.
36. See, eg., Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 307 (1810); Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch.) 137 (1803).
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lowed.37 Therefore, courts holding that the Eleventh Amendment's bar
may be waived cannot view the Amendment as creating a constitutional
restriction on subject matter jurisdiction.
The second major theory of the Eleventh Amendment views it as a
reinstatement of the common law immunity from suit, 38 which the states
had prior to Chisholm v. Georgia.39 In Chisholm, the Court held that
Article III of the Constitution permits states to be sued by citizens of
other states. Thus, some view the purpose of the Eleventh Amendment
as reversing Chisholm and reinstating the previously existing immunity."
Under this theory, the Eleventh Amendment does not create a constitu-
tional bar to suits against a state by its own citizens. The Eleventh
Amendment by its terms and history has nothing to do with such suits.
Chisholm and the Eleventh Amendment left untouched a state's common
law immunity to suits by citizens against their own state. Therefore, by
holding that a state may not be sued by its own citizens, the Court in
Hans, according to this view, was not interpreting the Eleventh Amend-
ment, but was only stating the unchanged principle of common law im-
munity.4" Since the sovereign traditionally could waive its immunity,42 a
state, like any sovereign, can waive its immunity and consent to be sued
by its citizens.4 3 Furthermore, because common law rules can be over-
37. See Sonsa v. Iowa, 419 U.S. at 398; Mitchell v. Maurer, 293 U.S. at 244; Mansfield, C.
& L.M. Ry. v. Swan, Ill U.S. at 382.
38. Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Wel-
fare, 411 U.S. 279, 288 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring in the result) ("Sovereign immunity is
a common law doctrine that long predates our Constitution and the Eleventh Amend-
ment .. "); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. at 16 ("The suability of a State without its consent
was a thing unknown to the law.").
39. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
40. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: (pts. 1 &
2), 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 538-49; Pt. II, 1261-78 (1977).
41. Justice Brennan has repeatedly articulated the view that the Eleventh Amendment
does not bar a state from being sued by its own citizens. See, e.g., Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 3156 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("There simply is no constitu-
tional principle of state sovereign immunity, and no constitutionally mandated policy of ex-
cluding suits against States from federal court."); County of Oneida, New York v. Oneida
Indian Nation, 105 S. Ct. 1245, 1262 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part); Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 687-88 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Employees of Dep't of Pub.
Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 309-22 (1973)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Atascadero, 105 S. Ct. at 3178-79 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
("[I]f Hans v. Louisiana . . . is a constitutional holding, it then reads into the Amendment
words that are not there and that cannot be reconciled with any principled view of constitu-
tional power. ... ).
42. See B. SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 560-69 (2d ed. 1984).
43. See, e.g., Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 531
(1936) ("Like any sovereignty, a state may voluntarily consent to be sued .. "). See gener-
ally P. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS (1983).
ridden by statute, a valid Congressional statute can authorize suits
against state governments by their own citizens.
One commentator, Professor Martha Field, has extended this sec-
ond theory further and argued that because the Eleventh Amendment's
prohibition of suits against states by citizens of other states is just a rein-
statement of the common law immunity that existed prior to Chisholm,
states may consent to be sued in federal court regardless of the citizen-
ship of the plaintiff, and Congress may authorize any suits against state
governments. 4 Professors Laurence Tribe and John Nowak have argued
similarly that Congress should be able to override the Eleventh Amend-
ment.45 Both scholars contend that the Amendment by its language and
history is directed at the federal courts and not Congress.46 They main-
tain that Congress is uniquely sensitive to both federal and state needs,
justifying judicial deference to Congressional laws affecting the states.
The major problem with treating the Eleventh Amendment as only
reinstating common law immunity is that the Amendment does not state
such a limited purpose. It is a constitutional provision that creates a
restriction on the judicial power and as a constitutional limitation, under
traditional principles, it cannot be overridden by Congress or waived.
A third view of the Eleventh Amendment treats it as merely restrict-
ing the diversity jurisdiction of federal courts.47 Article III of the Consti-
tution permits subject matter jurisdiction based on either the content of
the litigation-for example, federal question jurisdiction-or on the iden-
tity of the parties-for example, diversity jurisdiction. Article III, sec-
tion 2, identifies nine categories of cases and controversies which might
be heard in federal court. One of these is "Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Trea-
ties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority."4 This is the
provision which authorizes federal question jurisdiction. A different,
later passage of Article III, section 2, allows for "Controversies . . .be-
tween a State and Citizens of another State." This obviously is an au-
thorization for suits based on diversity of citizenship.
44. Field, supra note 40, at 538-49, 1261-78.
45. Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separa-
tion of Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682, 693-99 (1976);
Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes of Action Against State Govern-
ments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413,
1441-45 (1975).
46. Tribe, supra note 45, at 693-94; Nowak, supra note 45, at 1442.
47. See Fletcher, supra note 32; Gibbons, supra note 32.
48. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
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The language of the Eleventh Amendment clearly is directed at
modifying this latter provision. In fact, it simply states: "The Judicial
Power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit
. ..against one of the United States by Citizens of another state. .. ."
Because Chisholm only involved this latter part of Article III and did not
implicate federal question jurisdiction in any way, it makes sense to view
the Eleventh Amendment as restricting only diversity jurisdiction. In
short, according to this view, persuasively developed by Professor Wil-
liam Fletcher in a recent article,49 the Eleventh Amendment does not
bar suits against states based on other parts of Article III; most notably,
it does not preclude suits based on federal question jurisdiction."0
However, this approach is inconsistent with Hans v. Louisiana.' In
Hans, in which a resident of Louisiana sued the State of Louisiana, a
federal question was presented: whether Louisiana had impaired the ob-
ligations of contracts by refusing to pay interest owed on bonds it had
issued. If the Eleventh Amendment only restricts diversity suits and
does not affect federal question litigation, then Hans was wrongly de-
cided and the suit should not have been dismissed.
B. The Troubling Implications of Pennhurst
1. Restricting Federal Court Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court's decision in Pennhurst is one of the clearest
statements yet that a majority of the Supreme Court adopts the first of
these three theories and treats the Eleventh Amendment as a constitu-
tional limit on subject matter jurisdiction. The Court in Pennhurst con-
cluded: "The Amendment thus is a specific constitutional bar against
hearing even federal claims that otherwise would be within the jurisdic-
tion of the federal courts."52 Furthermore, the Court went out of its way
to make clear that it rejects the third theory, that the Eleventh Amend-
49. Fletcher, supra note 32.
50. Id.
51. 134 U.S. 1 (1890). Of course, all this might suggest is that Hans was wrongly de-
cided-that federal question suits should not be viewed as barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
This is a position which several commentators have persuasively made. See, e.g., Fletcher,
supra note 32, at 1087-91; Shapiro, supra note 4, at 70 ("the rationale of Hans v. Louisiana, if
not the result, should be regarded as an unforced error...."). In fact, Professor Shapiro
concludes that "momentum for the reconsideration of Hans is gathering." Id. at 80.
In Atascadero v. Scanlon, 105 S. Ct. 3142 (1985), the four dissenting Justices argued that
the Eleventh Amendment should be viewed only as a restriction of diversity suits against state
governments. Id. at 3158, 3171-72 (Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ.,
dissenting).
52. 465 U.S. at 120 (emphasis added).
ment only restricts diversity suits against states by citizens of other
states. As the Court observed:
[T]he implicit view of these cases seems to have been that once
jurisdiction is established on the basis of a federal question, no fur-
ther Eleventh Amendment inquiry is necessary with respect to
other claims raised in the case. This is an erroneous view and con-
trary to the principles established in our Eleventh Amendment de-
cisions. 'The Eleventh Amendment is an explicit limitation on the
judicial power of the United States. . . .' It deprives a federal
court of power to decide certain claims against States that other-
wise would be within the scope of Art. III's grant of jurisdiction.53
The Court's view of the Eleventh Amendment in Pennhurst is troub-
lesome in several respects. First, it is the most restrictive of federal court
jurisdiction and offers the states the greatest degree of immunity from
federal court review. As was observed above,54 the doctrine of waiver
and consent is completely inconsistent with treating the Eleventh
Amendment as a constitutional bar on subject matter jurisdiction. The
Supreme Court's earlier waiver decisions were possible because the Court
never explicitly held the Eleventh Amendment to be a constitutional bar-
rier to suit. After Pennhurst, it is unclear how any waiver can be al-
lowed. Furthermore, if the Eleventh Amendment is treated as a
constitutional restriction, Congress may not override it and authorize
suits against the states.5"
More importantly, it is unclear why the Court prefers the first the-
ory to the other two. The Court's approach certainly finds no more sup-
port than the others in the language or history of the Eleventh
Amendment, and arguably it has much less. The first theory seems least
flexible because it creates a constitutional preclusion of litigation and
seems least able to assure state compliance with the United States Consti-
tution. Pennhurst's conclusion that the Eleventh Amendment is a consti-
tutional bar reflects an arbitrary preference for state sovereignty over
federal supremacy. This choice is at odds with the very purpose of a
national constitution and a federal court system-the establishment and
53. 465 U.S. at 119-20 [citations omitted]. The Court reiterated this view in its most
recent Eleventh Amendment decision, Atascadero v. Scanlon, 105 S. Ct. 3142, 3146.
54. See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
55. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), established that Congress cannot
create federal court jurisdiction greater than that allowed by the Constitution.
There is one area in which the Supreme Court has allowed Congress to create liability of
states in federal courts notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment. The Court held that when
Congress acts pursuant to section five of the Fourteenth Amendment it may create state liabil-
ity because the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to limit state sovereignty. Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
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protection of basic rights and the limitation of government power to in-
fringe upon those rights.
The Supreme Court in the recent decision of Atascadero State Hospi-
tal v. Scanlon5 6 reiterated the view that the Eleventh Amendment is a
constitutional limit on the subject matter jurisdiction of the federal
courts.5 7 In doing so, the Court emphasized the importance of protect-
ing state sovereignty. 8 Implicitly, the Court is saying that protecting
state sovereignty is more important than assuring state compliance with
the Constitution; that is, a state's sovereignty entitles it to violate the
Constitution. This premise is blatantly inconsistent with the Supremacy
Clause of the Constitution and the fundamental notion that all govern-
ment action, at every level, must comply with the constitution.
2. Subverting Constitutional Protection: The Implications of Pennhurst
for Suits Against State Government Officers
The second major implication of the Pennhurst decision is that it
undermines the rationale of Ex parte Young,59 the decision which pro-
vides the most important way of gaining state compliance with the Con-
stitution. Edward Young, the Attorney General of Minnesota, was sued
in federal court for an injunction to prevent him from enforcing a re-
cently adopted statute regulating railroad rates. The Supreme Court
held that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against state of-
ficers to enjoin violations of federal law.60 In reaching this holding, the
Court concluded that state officers have no authority to violate the Con-
stitution and laws of the United States. Hence, their illegal acts are
stripped of state authority and such suits are not precluded by the Elev-
enth Amendment.6' The Court in Ex parte Young wrote:
The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if it be
so, the use of the name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional
act to the injury of complainants is a proceeding without the au-
thority of and one which does not affect the State in its sovereign
or governmental capacity. It is simply an illegal act upon the part
of a state official in attempting by the use of the name of the State
to enforce a legislative enactment which is void because unconsti-
tutional. If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to en-
force be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer in
56. 105 S. Ct. 3142.
57. Id. at 3145-46.
58. Id. at 3146 n.2.
59. 209 U.S. 123 (1907). For a discussion of the background of this case, see C. JACOBS,
supra note 32, at 138-47.
60. 209 U.S. at 159-60.
61. Id.
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proceeding under such enactment comes into conffict with the su-
perior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case stripped
of his official or representative character and is subjected in his
person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State
has no power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to
the supreme authority of the United States.6z
The decision in Ex parte Young long has been recognized as the
primary way of circumventing the Eleventh Amendment and of assuring
state compliance with federal law. As Professor Charles Alan Wright
has noted, "the doctrine of Ex parte Young seems 'indispensable to the
establishment of constitutional government and the rule of law."63 Simi-
larly, Professor Kenneth Culp Davis has remarked: "From that day to
this,. . . Young has been the mainstay in challenging [state] governmen-
tal action." r
The decision in Ex parte Young is based on simple principles. It
distinguishes between the state and its officers, much as the common law
always has distinguished between a principal and its agent. 65 The deci-
sion states that the agent, the officer who acts illegally, is powerless to try
to protect such actions by invoking the immunity of the principal, the
state. The conclusion is that an officer acting illegally is stripped of state
authority such that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against
officers.
Because state authority protects only lawful actions of state officers,
it follows directly that a state officer who violates state law also is
stripped of state authority for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.
This is exactly what the Third Circuit held on remand in Pennhurst, con-
cluding that it could give relief against state officers based on their viola-
62. Id. For an excellent discussion of the doctrine of Ex parte Young, see M. REDISH,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 154-59
(1980).
63. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 292 (4th ed. 1983). Professor Wright also
states: "The effect of Ex parte Young is to bring within the scope of federal judicial review
actions that otherwise might escape such review, and to subject the states to the restrictions of
the United States Constitution that they might otherwise be able safely to ignore." Id. at 290.
Professor Wright, however, does regard Ex parte Young as resting on a fiction. Id. at 292.
64. Davis, Suing the Government by Falsely Pretending to Sue an Officer, 29 U. CHI. LAW
REV. 435, 437 (1962).
65. See, eg., Restatement (Second) of Agency Authority §§ 7, 228, 383 (1958); A. REUS-
CHLEIN & W. GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 13
(1979); Van Arsdale v. Metropolitan Title Guarantee Co., 103 Misc. 2d 104, 425 N.Y.S.2d 482
(1980); Webb v. Webb, 602 S.W.2d 127 ('ex. Civ. App. 1980); Forgeron, Inc. v. Hansen, 149
Cal. App. 2d 352, 358, 308 P.2d 406, 410 (1957); Grasslands Water Ass'n v. Lucky Leven
Land & Cattle Co., 112 Cal. App. 2d 776, 247 P.2d 380 (1952) (distinguishing between author-
ity of agent and principal).
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tion of state statutes.16 In fact, the case for federal relief is even stronger
in Pennhurst than in Ex parte Young. In Ex parte Young, the state of-
ficer, the Attorney General, was enforcing a statute adopted by the Min-
nesota Legislature, while in Pennhurst, the officers were violating a
statute adopted by the legislature. In Ex parte Young, the state author-
ized the officer's conduct, while in Pennhurst it proscribed it. Thus, if
there was no finding of state authority in Ex parte Young, then none
exists in Pennhurst.
The Supreme Court, however, rejected this reasoning in Pennhurst
and held that federal courts can enjoin state officers from violating fed-
eral law, but not state law.67 The Court stated that although the reason-
ing of Exparte Young would seemingly direct a contrary result, Exparte
Young must be regarded as a "fiction" and an "irony" created entirely to
assure state compliance with the federal Constitution.6" The notion that
state officials are stripped of authority when they act illegally was treated
by the Pennhurst Court as applicable only when the vindication of fed-
eral rights is at stake. In other words, the Court in Pennhurst admitted it
does not believe that Ex parte Young rests on a defensible distinction
between the acts of the officer and the acts of the state. The Court explic-
itly stated that it does not believe that officers who act illegally are
stripped of their authority. Rather, the Court said that these fictions
were created and are applied just as a way to achieve the outcome of
allowing federal courts to halt unconstitutional state conduct.
69
This holding is troubling in several respects. First, why should Ex
parte Young's holding be dismissed as a result-oriented fiction?7° Why
not preserve the principle that has existed throughout this century that
66. Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hosp., 673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982) (en banc).
67. 465 U.S. at 119-20.
68. Id. at 105-06.
69. Id. at 105.
70. The principle that an agent may not claim immunities of a principal is established at
common law and embodied in decisions in other contexts. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 347 (1958) ("An agent does not have the immunities of the principal although
acting at the direction of his principal."); Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Fleet Corp.,
258 U.S. 549, 568 (1922) (immunity of United States from liability on its own contracts does
not extend to its agents); Aungst v. Roberts Constr. Co., 95 Wash.2d 439, 442, 625 P.2d 167,
168 (1981) ("an agent. . . may not avail itself of the immunities of its principal although it
may have been acting at the direction of the principal"); Mullins v. Pine Manor College, 389
Mass. 47, 59, 449 N.E.2d 331, 341 (1983) ("The general rule, however, is that an agent is not
entitled to the protection of his principal's immunity even if the agent is acting on behalf of his
principal"); Salt River Valley Water Users' Ass'n v. Giglio, 113 Ariz. 190, 197, 549 P.2d 162,
169 (1976) (immunity of United States does not extend to its agents); Florio v. Mayor and
Aldermen of Jersey City, 101 N.J.L. 535, 542, 129 A. 470, 473 (N.J. 1925) (immunity of city is
not possessed by its agents).
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state officers who act illegally are not cloaked with the authority of the
state? The only answer the Court gives is that liability ultimately would
undermine the entire Eleventh Amendment. 7' It is unclear, however,
why allowing federal courts to give relief based on violations of state law
when pendent claims are presented would significantly reduce a state's
protection under the Eleventh Amendment. Because state officers can be
enjoined from violating federal laws, it adds little in the way of an in-
fringement of state sovereignty to also allow injunctions against viola-
tions of state law. To the contrary, injunctions against violations of state
law are less of an infringement of state sovereignty than injunctions based
on federal law. A state can protect itself from the former simply by
changing its law. If Pennsylvania did not like the Third Circuit's inter-
pretation of its statute, it could simply revise the statute to make its
meaning clearer. However, a state has no recourse when a federal court
injunction is based on federal law.
Second, the Court's reasoning casts serious doubt on the continued
viability of Exparte Young. As discussed above,72 the Court in Exparte
Young held that illegal acts of a state officer are "ultra vires"-without
authority-and therefore not protected by the Eleventh Amendment. In
refusing to extend Ex parte Young to violations of state law by state of-
ficers, the Court in Pennhurst described the ultra vires doctrine relied
upon by the Court in Exparte Young as creating "a narrow and question-
able" exception to the Eleventh Amendment.73 Furthermore, the Court
held that the Eleventh Amendment applies if the relief "runs" against the
state.7" Clearly the relief "ran against the state" in Ex parte Young, in
which the Court permitted issuance of an injunction against the Attorney
General to keep him from enforcing a state statute.7" Inevitably, suits to
stop officers from applying state law "run against the state."
Moreover, once the Supreme Court recognizes that Ex parte Young
rests on no "principle" and is only a result-oriented "fiction," the case
will survive only so long as the Supreme Court believes that the fiction
produces a desirable result. The Pennhurst majority said that the fiction
of Ex parte Young exists to allow federal court review of state conduct
alleged to violate the Constitution and laws of the United States.76 In
71. Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 106. The Court states that the view that would allow an action
against a state when a state official allegedly violates state law "rests on a fiction, is wrong on
the law, and, most important, would emasculate the Eleventh Amendment." Id.
72. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
73. 465 U.S. at 116 (emphasis added).
74. Id.
75. 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
76. 465 U.S. at 105-06.
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other words, the holding in Ex parte Young will be followed only so long
as the Court believes that it is necessary to have federal courts available
to assure state compliance with the Constitution.
This observation is troubling since the Supreme Court often has de-
clared that state courts are just as good as federal courts at upholding the
Constitution and laws of the United States. For example, in Stone v.
Powell,77 the Supreme Court announced that state courts are equal to
federal courts at upholding the Constitution: "[W]e are unwilling to as-
sume that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to
constitutional rights in the trial and appellate courts of the several States.
State courts, like federal courts, have a constitutional obligation to safe-
guard personal liberties and to uphold federal law."7 8 Similarly, in the
recent case of Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, the Court declared
that "[i]t denigrates the judges who serve on the state courts to suggest
that they will not enforce the supreme law of the land."7 9
If state courts are as competent as federal courts in upholding the
Constitution, then it is unnecessary to create a fiction to facilitate federal
court review. When the Court in Pennhurst declared that there is no
principled basis for separating the acts of the officer from the acts of the
state and thus characterized the holding in Ex parte Young as a mere
fiction, it may have taken a large step towards overruling Ex parte
Young. The effect of such a holding would be to almost completely im-
munize state governments from federal court accountability such that
states could violate the Constitution with impunity.8"
3. Undermining the Availability of the Federal Forum: Pennhurst's Effect
on Litigants' Choice of Forums
A third major implication of Pennhurst is that it might force many
cases entirely out of federal court. After Pennhurst, how should a liti-
gant with both federal and state claims against the state proceed? There
are two possible choices. One approach would be to bring both the fed-
eral claims and the state claims in state court, in which case the federal
forum would be completely lost. Alternatively, a litigant could bring the
federal claims in federal court and the state claims in state court. This
approach, however, risks having the federal claims completely barred by
77. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
78. Id. at 494 n.35 (citing Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 341-44
(1816)).
79. 105 S. Ct. at 3146 n.2.
80. See, e.g., C. WRIGHT, supra note 63, at 291-92 (without the doctrine of Ex parte
Young it would be difficult to secure state compliance with the Constitution).
[Vol. 12:643
PENNHURST V HALDERMAN
res judicata should the state court decide its case first."1 If a state court
decides in favor of the defendant on the state law claims, the defendant
could then go to federal court and assert res judicata or collateral estop-
pel as a bar to a federal court decision on the federal law claims.8 2 Be-
cause the claims arise from the same subject matter, and since all of the
federal claims could have been raised in state court, all litigants who split
their claims after Pennhurst risk the res judicata bar.
Thus, to assure that both the federal and state law claims are de-
cided, a litigant must go to state court and completely forego the federal
forum. Paradoxically, while the Supreme Court in Pennhurst recognized
that the purpose of allowing suits against state officers in federal court is
to provide a federal forum to assure state compliance with federal law, 3
by forcing litigants to split their claims, the Court undermines this goal.
The majority in Pennhurst considered this claim-splitting effect, but was
untroubled by it: "[S]uch considerations of policy cannot override the
constitutional limitation on the authority of the federal judiciary to adju-
dicate suits against a State. . . . That a litigant's choice of forum is re-
duced 'has long been understood to be a part of the tension inherent in
our system of federalism.' "984
This passage indicates how little the Supreme Court values the avail-
ability of a federal forum. At the very least, it wil mean that litigants
with both state and federal claims must make difficult guesses about opti-
mal strategy. Is the perceived difference between state and federal courts
so large as to justify going to federal court, even at the expense of giving
up state law claims? Or are the state law claims so important, perhaps
because of uncertainty about the strength of the federal law claims or the
nature of the relief available, that it is better to go to state court and give
up the federal forum?
4. The Constitutional Status of Pendent Jurisdiction After Pennhurst
Pennhurst casts serious doubts on the constitutional status of pen-
dent jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has long held that a federal court
deciding federal law claims also may decide state law claims that "derive
81. Professor Shapiro also notes this possible effect, supra note 4, at 80-82.
82. See, ag., Migra v. Warren City School Dist., 465 U.S. 75 (1984); Kremer v. Chemical
Constr. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980) (state court deci-
sions are accorded collateral estoppel and res judicata effects in federal court).
83. 465 U.S. at 105.
84. Id. at 123 (quoting Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of
Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 298 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring)).
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from a common nucleus of operative fact." 5 Permitting pendent jurisdic-
tion maximizes judicial efficiency since litigants are able to try a case in
only one court, and only one court system expends judicial resources on
the matter. The effect of the decision in Pennhurst, where litigants with
federal and state causes of action must split their claims and try the case
in two forums, is exactly what the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction is
designed to avoid.8 6 Furthermore, by allowing the federal court to de-
cide a matter on state law grounds, pendent jurisdiction reduces the
number of situations in which federal courts must decide cases on the
basis of federal constitutional law.87 Also, as explained above, pendent
jurisdiction reinforces state sovereignty because decisions on state law
grounds are least commanding of states, since states can modify their law
to overcome undesirable federal court decisions.
The major problem with pendent jurisdiction is that it appears in-
consistent with the language of Article III8 and 28 U.S.C. section
1331,89 which provide federal court jurisdiction for all cases arising
under the Constitution or laws of the United States. It is unclear why
state law claims heard via pendent jurisdiction "arise under federal law."
A literalist would say that the federal law claims arise under federal law
and the state law claims arise under state law. No matter how great the
efficiency justifications for pendent jurisdiction, it cannot be allowed if
not authorized by the Constitution and the federal question jurisdiction
statute.
The traditional answer to this problem has been to interpret the
word "case" to include all legal claims arising from a common nucleus of
operative facts. That is, a case arises under federal law if a federal claim
is apparent on the face of the complaint. The whole case, all matters
arising from the common nucleus of operative facts, arise under federal
law.90 Thus, even state law claims may be considered when presented in
this context. As such, state law claims against state officers are within
85. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966) (articulating the test for
pendent jurisdiction). See also Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 545-46 (1974) ("[I]t is evident
from Gibbs that pendent state law claims are not always, or even almost always, to be dis-
missed and not adjudicated. On the contrary, given advantages of economy and convenience
and no unfairness to litigants, Gibbs contemplates adjudication of these claims.").
86. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 103-05 (4th ed. 1983).
87. There is a long-standing policy that federal courts should avoid deciding cases based
on constitutional grounds, if nonconstitutional bases for decision are available. See, e.g., Ash-
wander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
88. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
89. Section 1331 provides: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions ... [arising] under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1985).
90. See Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725 (1966); C. WRIGHT, supra note 63, at 103-09.
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the judicial power of the United States when pendent to claims properly
within federal court. If a federal claim against the state is not barred by
the Eleventh Amendment, then the case is within the judicial power of
the United States and the federal court also may give relief on pendent
state claims.
The Supreme Court explicitly rejected this reasoning in Pennhurst.
The Court concluded that pendent jurisdiction is just a "judge-made doc-
trine. . . inferred from the general language of Article III."91 It held
that such a "judge-made doctrine of expediency and efficiency"92 cannot
"be viewed as displacing the explicit limitation on federal jurisdiction
contained in the Eleventh Amendment."93 Therefore, although the Elev-
enth Amendment did not bar the federal court from giving relief against
state officers on the federal claims, it could not hear pendent state-law
claims against the state officers.
Again, the Court's reasoning is troubling, because it undermines the
constitutional legitimacy of pendent jurisdiction. First, if pendent juris-
diction is just a "judge-made doctrine of expediency and efficiency" it is
unclear how it can continue to exist constitutionally. It is firmly estab-
lished that federal courts can exercise no jurisdiction except that pro-
vided for both in statute and in Article III.9 If pendent jurisdiction is
"judge-made" and not inherent in the definition of a "case," then federal
courts have given themselves a power contained in neither the jurisdic-
tional statutes nor the Constitution. The Court offers no explanation for
how a judge-made doctrine can confer jurisdiction. In fact, if pendent
jurisdiction is not implicit in Article III, then Congress could not author-
ize it, even if it wanted to, since it is firmly established that Article III
imposes a ceiling on federal judicial power.95
On the other hand, the Court might be saying that pendent jurisdic-
tion is judge-made because it arises from judicial interpretation of the
language of Article III and 28 U.S.C. section 1331. If so, then the Elev-
enth Amendment does not bar federal court review of pendent state law
claims. The Eleventh Amendment says that the judicial power of the
federal courts shall not extend to "suits" against a state by citizens of
other states. Under Ex parte Young, suits against state officers are not
91. 465 U.S. at 117.
92. Id. at 120.
93. Id. at 117-18.
94. Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I
Cranch) 137 (1803).
95. See National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949) (a majority
of the Justices held that Congress may not allocate functions to Article III courts other than
those enumerated in Article III); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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barred from the federal courts by the Eleventh Amendment. There is no
reason why federal courts may decide only part of such suits, because the
Eleventh Amendment either precludes the suit or it does not. In other
words, the Court errs when it says that the question is whether pendent
jurisdiction displaces the Eleventh Amendment. It is the doctrine of Ex
parte Young that displaces the Eleventh Amendment by allowing suits
against the state officer, and it is the language of Article III that allows a
federal court to decide all of a case.
5. Suits Against Local Governments After Pennhurst
A final implication of Pennhurst is that it represents a potentially
significant expansion of the immunity of local governments under the
Eleventh Amendment. The Supreme Court has repeatedly refused to ex-
tend the Eleventh Amendment to protect cities or counties from suit.96
Yet in Pennhurst, the Court held that relief against county as well as
state officers was barred by the Eleventh Amendment. The Court stated:
Respondents contend that regardless of the applicability of the
Eleventh Amendment to their state claims against petitioner state
officials, the judgment may still be upheld against petitioner county
officials. We are not persuaded. . . . [Flunding for the county
mental retardation programs comes almost entirely from the State
... and the costs of the masters have been borne by the
State. . . . Finally the MH/MR Act contemplates that the state
and county officials will cooperate in operating mental retardation
programs.
97
The state's funding of a county program and state cooperation thus were
deemed sufficient to create an Eleventh Amendment barrier to suits
against the county.
This holding is a marked expansion of local government immunity,
which the Court supports by citation to only one Supreme Court prece-
dent, Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.98
In that case, however, the Supreme Court reached exactly the opposite
result, holding that state funding of an interstate agency did not confer
the protection of the Eleventh Amendment upon the agency.99 The
Court stated that it "has consistently refused to construe the Amend-
96. See, e.g., Monnell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.54 (1978);
Mount Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280-81 (1977); Lincoln County v.
Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890); See also Tuveson v. Florida Governor's Council on Indian
Affairs, 734 F.2d 730, 732 (11th Cir. 1984); Fouche v. Jekyll Island State Park Auth., 713 F.2d
1518, 1520 (11th Cir. 1983).
97. 465 U.S. at 123-24.
98. 440 U.S. 391 (1979).
99. Id. at 400-02.
ment to afford protection to political subdivisions such as counties and
municipalities, even though such entities exercise a 'slice of state
power.' "10( Only if a money judgment has to be paid directly by the
state treasury does the Eleventh Amendment apply. In Pennhurst, the
state was not obligated to pay any money judgment issued against the
county.
Furthermore, the factors the Court considers in Pennhurst to justify
the conclusion that a county is immune to suit can be used by states to
immunize their cities and counties from litigation. Under Pennhurst, a
voluntary financial grant from the state means that the county cannot be
sued. Therefore, any time a local government is sued, if the state had
granted funds to the entity, the entity could be protected from suit be-
cause a money judgment would be paid, at least partially, from state rev-
enues. In fact, theoretically, states could immunize their localities just by
enacting statutes promising to indemnify them from any costs incurred
as a result of federal court litigation because that indemnification would
mean the whole of the damages would be paid by the state treasury. The
fact that the state is acting voluntarily would not constitute a waiver of
its Eleventh Amendment immunity, since in Pennhurst Pennsylvania's
contributions to the challenged county programs were completely
voluntary.
Thus, if state "cooperation" is enough to create Eleventh Amend-
ment immunity for local governments, a state can immunize its political
subdivisions at absolutely no cost. All it needs to do is enact general
statutes declaring a policy of cooperation in major areas of policy. Ap-
parently, after Pennhurst, this is enough to create immunity.
It is especially troubling that the Court offers no justification for this
potentially major extension of immunity; moreover, it offers no consider-
ation of what the effects might be on the judiciary's ability to assure local
governments' compliance with the Constitution. In fact, the Court does
not even admit that it is creating immunity for local governments in situ-
ations in which it has never before applied the Eleventh Amendment.
IH. Preserving Federal Court Jurisdiction: Limiting the Effect
of Pennhurst
It is essential that Pennhurst be limited so that it does not under-
mine the availability of the federal courts as a forum for the protection of
constitutional rights from state infringement. The premise of this Article
is that one core role of the federal courts is to uphold the United States
100. Id. at 401.
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Constitution by hearing complaints of unconstitutional actions by gov-
ernments and government officers at all levels. 1 ' History shows that
state courts often are inhospitable to suits against state governments and
state officers for violating the federal Constitution. ° 2 Federal courts are
more likely to perceive their role as upholding constitutional rights, and
the independence assured by Article III produces a judiciary more likely
to protect fundamental rights from legislative majorities.'
0 3
It is unlikely that the Court will overrule Pennhurst in the near fu-
ture and abandon its recent interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment
as a restriction on subject matter jurisdiction in the federal courts."°
Therefore, the problem is how to limit the effects of Pennhurst.
First, it is essential that the Court unequivocally reaffirm its holding
in Ex parte Young that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar claims
against state officers who are alleged to have acted in violation of the
Constitution and laws of the United States. The Court should explain
that the role of the federal courts is to uphold federal law. Just as state
courts have primary responsibility for interpreting and applying state
law,'0 5 so it is the responsibility of the federal courts to hear federal con-
stitutional claims. The doctrine of Ex parte Young should be recognized
as essential to assure the supremacy of federal law. Because states cannot
be sued directly under the Court's interpretation of the Eleventh Amend-
ment, the only mechanism for federal courts to ensure state compliance
with the Constitution is the authority to enjoin unconstitutional conduct
by state officers.'
0 6
The Court in Pennhurst recognized that "the Young doctrine rests
on the need to promote the vindication of federal rights."'0 7 The Court
must now explicitly declare the importance of the availability of a federal
101. See M. REDISH, supra note 62, at 1-3.
102. See Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. RrV. 1105 (1977) for an excellent
discussion of this history.
103. This Article does not attempt to develop a full explanation or theory to support its
underlying assumption that federal courts provide a unique and important forum for the vindi-
cation of constitutional rights. For one argument supporting this assumption, see Redish,
supra note 62, at 1-5.
104. Indeed, the Court recently declared that state sovereign immunity is constitutionally
required because of federalism considerations. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 105 S. Ct.
3142, 3146 (1985). In light of the composition of the Court and the possibility of future
appointments being made by a conservative President, it is difficult to be optimisitic that there
soon will be a court committed to an interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment that will
provide a federal forum for the protection of constitutional rights.
105. See, e.g., Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (state law provides the rule of
decision in a diversity suit).
106. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
107. 465 U.S. at 105.
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forum to achieve this crucial objective. In short, Pennhurst must not be-
come the first step in overruling Ex parte Young: Ex parte Young should
not be dismissed as a "fiction", 08 but recognized as an essential vehicle
for the supremacy of the Constitution so long as the Eleventh Amend-
ment prevents suits against States.
Second, if the federal forum is to remain attractive for litigants chal-
lenging the constitutionality of state actions, plaintiffs must find some
way to bring pendent state law claims in federal court. As previously
explained,10 9 after Pennhurst, a litigant who wishes to pursue both fed-
eral and state claims against a state officer must either file both claims in
state court or split the claims, thus risking the possibility that the state
claim, if decided first, will be a res judicata bar to the federal court decid-
ing the federal claim.
One way to prevent this effect is for the Court to interpret Pennhurst
as not precluding pendent claims in federal court against state officers
acting in excess of their authority. The Court in Pennhurst interprets
sovereign immunity law as precluding injunctive relief "against State offi-
cials for failing to carry out their duties under State statutes" or "on
violations of state statutes that command purely discretionary duties."' 10
The Court stated: "Since it cannot be doubted that the statutes at issue
here gave petitioners broad discretion in operating Pennhurst, the con-
duct alleged in this case would not be ultra vires even under the stan-
dards of the dissent's cases."'' Therefore, the Court in Pennhurst does
not address the situation in which the state officer violates state law or
acts in excess of lawful authority. Accordingly, Pennhurst should not be
construed to preclude pendent state-law claims against state officers in
those circumstances.
A distinction has been drawn between federal court review of discre-
tionary and ministerial acts of state officers at least since the time of Mar-
bury v. Madison."2 Furthermore, common law principles of agency long
have held that an agent who acts in excess of his authority is stripped of
108. In one sense, Ex parte Young obviously is a fiction because restraining state officers
serves to limit the state's power. An injunction against the officer is indistinguishable, at least
in effect, from an injunction against the state because the state always acts through officers. In
another sense, Ex parte Young is defensible because it adopts a well-established distinction
between principal and agent. See supra note 65. As such, Ex parte Young merely reflects the
law of agency which provides that an agent may not claim the immunities of the principal. See
supra note 70. Although the distinction between principal and agent is itself a fiction, it is a
well accepted part of American law.
109. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
110. 465 U.S. at 109-10.
111. Id. at 110-11 [citations omitted].
112. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See also Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
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the principal's authority. 113 The Court in Pennhurst should be viewed as
simply holding that when a state officer has discretion, federal courts are
unwilling to review the exercise of that discretion. Also, the states' own
policies are furthered by allowing federal courts to enjoin state officers
who act illegally. Although a state has a strong interest in the manner in
which its officers exercise discretion, and therefore may resent federal
oversight, a state has less basis for objecting to review of state officers
who are clearly violating state law. Thus, the Court should hold that
even after Pennhurst, federal courts may hear pendent state claims
against state officers who are alleged to have violated their ministerial
duties under state law. In this way, Pennhurst's effect of forcing federal
claims out of federal court can be minimized.
An alternative way for litigants to bring state law claims into federal
court after Pennhurst is to argue that the state law in question gives rise
to a liberty or property interest protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Under the Burger Court's procedural due
process doctrines, state law can create both liberty and property rights,
either explicitly or by creating an expectation that gives rise to a vested
right." 4 For example, in Pennhurst, the Court of Appeals found that
state law required the state "to adopt the 'least restrictive environment'
approach for the care of the mentally retarded.""' This state law creates
a legitimate expectation on the part of patients and their guardians that
care will be provided in the least restrictive environment." 6 That is,
under the Burger Court's approach to procedural due process, the state
has created a liberty interest, and thus the state's violation of its own law
constitutes a denial of liberty without due process." 7 In this manner, the
state law claims can be brought into federal court along with the federal
claim, avoiding the need for litigants to split their suits." 8
113. See, e.g., A. B. Leach Co. v. Pearson, 275 U.S. 120 (1927); Sloan Shipyards Corp. v.
United States Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549 (1922); see also supra notes 65 & 70.
114. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976) (state law defines the existence of prop-
erty and liberty for the purposes of procedural due process); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972).
115. 612 F.2d 84, 95-107 (3d Cir. 1979) (en banc). See also In re Schmidt, 494 Pa. 86, 92,
429 A.2d 631, 636-37 (1981) (holding that under Pennsylvania law the least restrictive envi-
ronment should be used for the care of the mentally retarded).
116. The specific Pennsylvania statute which creates this expectation is the state's Mental
Health and Mental Retardation Act of 1966, 50 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 4101-4704 (Purdon
1985).
117. See, e.g., Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980) ("state statutes may create liberty
interests that are entitled to the procedural protections" of due process); Wolff v. McDonald,
418 U.S. 539 (1974) (statute created liberty interest which due process clause protected).
118. However, such suits would be barred from federal court if the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), is extended to apply to claims that liberty has
Finally, the Court should make clear that Pennhurst does not
change the long-standing doctrine that the Eleventh Amendment does
not protect municipal governments or their officers from liability. The
Court always has held that the Eleventh Amendment only applies to
"states and state officials." '119 For example, in Mount Healthy City
School District Board of Education v. Doyle 20 the Court stated that the
"bar of the Eleventh Amendment to suit in federal courts extends to
States and state officials in appropriate circumstances, (citations omitted)
but does not extend to counties and similar municipal corporations."'?'
Therefore, the Court should make clear that municipalities are not
immunized from suit just because they "cooperate" with or receive fund-
ing from a state for the activity giving rise to the lawsuit.122 A munici-
pality should be treated in the same manner as any other state officer,
and a suit against a municipality should be precluded only if the "action
is in essence one for the recovery of money from the state [and] the state
is the real, substantial party in interest."' 23
The ideal approach to the Eleventh Amendment would be, as sev-
eral commentators have suggested, 124 to treat the Eleventh Amendment,
as its language directs, as a restriction on diversity suits against state
governments. As these commentators have demonstrated, such an ap-
proach is consistent with the language and history of the Eleventh
Amendment. More importantly, by this view, because the Eleventh
Amendment would not preclude federal question suits against state gov-
ernments, federal courts could uphold the Constitution and halt state
violations of federal rights. States would be directly liable and accounta-
ble for their unconstitutional acts. However, because the Court explicitly
rejected this view in Pennhurst,125 and it does not appear likely that the
Court will adopt this view in the forseeable future,'26 attention should
been deprived. Parratt holds that if a person claims that his or her property has been deprived,
and the state provides adequate post-deprivation remedies, then there is no basis for a claim
that due process has been denied. Id. at 543-44. The Supreme Court has not ruled on the
question whether Parratt applies to claims of denial of liberty. There is a division of opinion
among lower courts on this subject. Compare Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639 (7th Cir.
1981) with Mills v. Smith, 656 F.2d 337 (8th Cir. 1981).
119. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
120. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
121. Id. at 280 [citations omitted].
122. In Pennhurst, the Court rejected the argument that county officials were not immu-
nized by the Eleventh Amendment, because the state official had "cooperated" with the county
in the operation of the program. 465 U.S. 123-24.
123. Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945).
124. See Fletcher, supra note 32; Gibbons, supra note 32; Shapiro, supra note 4.
125. 465 U.S. at 119-20. See supra text accompanying notes 52-53.
126. See supra note 62.
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focus on ways to limit the effect of Pennhurst to insure that federal courts
remain available to vindicate constitutional claims.
Conclusion
The protection of civil and constitutional liberties over the past
thirty years has been achieved through federal court review and enforce-
ment. In almost every major area involving controversial constitutional
decisions-from school desegregation to abortion to reapportionment,
state governments and state courts have resisted the Supreme Court's
holdings.'27 If there is any lesson to be learned from the last quarter-
century, it is that the supremacy of federal law is not achieved automati-
cally, but rather through federal court intervention.
The Supreme Court's decision in Pennhurst v. Halderman failed to
recognize the importance of federal court review of state and local gov-
ernment action. Extension of the Eleventh Amendment in ways hinted
at in the decision would bring about a major change not just in the fed-
eral court system, but in the principle of supremacy of federal law and
ultimately our entire system of government. Imagine if states could have
immunized local school systems from federal court desegregation orders
just by giving grants or pledging cooperation. Imagine if federal courts
were unable to order state election commissioners to reapportion legisla-
tures. Without federal court review to assure state and local compliance
with the Constitution and federal laws, "federalism" will no longer accu-
rately describe our system of government. American government will
become one of "localism."
127. Judge John Minor Wisdom recently wrote:
Were it not for federal courts willing to protect federally guaranteed rights at the
expense of state rights, freedom riders, peaceful marchers, protesters delivering hand-
bills, demonstrators kneeling in prayer on the steps of segregated churches, and other
advocates of civil rights would have languished-who knows how long- in local
jails while they pursued their remedies in state courts.
Wisdom, Foreward: The Ever- Whirling Wheels of American Federalism, 59 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1063, 1077 (1984).
